

**DCI BRIEFING
Congressional Armed
Forces Sub-Committee**

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

- I. Soviet and Chinese parties have been publicly quarreling about both domestic and foreign policies, and Khrushchev and Mao have apparently come to dislike each other.**
 - A. Moscow resents Peiping's presentation of its "general line" (particularly the "leap forward"), and of subsequent commune program, as original contributions worthy of study and emulation.**
 - 1. Soviet spokesmen, including Khrushchev, have centered fire on commune program, denying its theoretical correctness and practical feasibility.**
 - 2. Soviets seem to believe that Chinese programs, and Chinese claims for them, constitute challenge to Soviet leadership of Bloc.**
 - 3. Dominant group in Chinese party in recent months has been defending its domestic policies against criticism by Soviet party and some of own comrades.**
 - B. Chinese have centered their criticism of Soviet policies on Khrushchev's initiatives toward West.**
 - 1. Chinese, who are unwilling to wait indefinitely to take Taiwan, apprehensive that friendlier US-USSR relations not in their interest.**
 - 2. Implicit criticism of Khrushchev's "soft" tactics continues to be voiced by Chinese propagandists, who insist that any**

"thaw" will result only from "unremitting struggle" by bloc and defeat of US "war and aggression policy."

- 3. Peiping and Moscow diverged sharply on treatment of President's December trip and State of the Union message, with Moscow being reasonably factual and Peiping accusing President of "paying lip service to peace."**
 - 4. In past year, Chicomus claiming greater voice in revolutionary struggle in underdeveloped areas Asia, Africa and Latin America. Chicomus encourage more militant approach than do Soviets.**
- C. Khrushchev, obviously irritated with Chinese, seems anxious to disassociate USSR from Peiping's "hard" line and to convince West he wants detente atmosphere.**
- 1. In statements during visit to Peiping last October, his remarks on not testing stability of capitalist system "by force" and that "We Communists of the USSR" hope to end "cold war" contrasted with more belligerent Chinese statements.**
 - 2. Moscow's propaganda treatment of Sino-Indian border dispute and Peiping's quarrel with Djakarta's action against Overseas Chinese is largely neutral and noncommittal--such failure to support another Communist regime unprecedented in history of Soviet diplomacy.**
 - 3. During impending visits, Khrushchev will seek to reassure Indian and Indonesian leaders of Moscow's neutrality in their disputes with Communist China.**

D. Khrushchev has been making pointed remarks to Chinese about the need to go along with his tactics.

1. In obvious reference to China, Khrushchev said publicly in Budapest (1 Dec), "If this or that country becomes conceited, this can only play into the hands of the enemy."

2. The Chinese countered on Stalin's 80th birthday anniversary (21 Dec) by praising Stalin as an "uncompromising enemy of imperialism."

E. Unlike the Chinese, who are unencumbered by policy commitments in the West, Khrushchev seems to feel that foreign-policy objectives vis-a-vis the West are overriding and that support to "anti-colonial struggles"--in Algeria, for example--must be qualified by these diplomatic considerations.

II. However, we think the significance of these disagreements for the present has perhaps been exaggerated by press. Sino-Soviet relationship still a meaningful alliance, and will almost certainly remain so for long time.

A. Moscow continues supply industrial equipment essential to development of China's economy. (Chinese, however, are paying for this with exports.) While not providing Chinese with nuclear weapons they presumably would like to have, Moscow also continues to assist China to build up its military establishment.

B. Chinese for their part have refrained from launching military venture which would poison atmosphere for "summit" negotiations.

III. Both parties have too much at stake to permit an open rupture.

A. But we believe there will be a kind of gradual growing apart over the next few years, so that, even though lip service done to theme of unity, each party will come to act more and more in terms of its view of its own national needs and interests.